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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Putting it differently, I inquire, then: why did countries that elected to act similarly globally turn 
out to vary so strikingly internally, at the domestic level, when it came to resultant interactions between 
unions and the state? That the book focuses on three very dissimilar states serves to demonstrate the 
wide sweep of countries that, rather comparably, were compelled to confront the global economy in new 
ways at a critical historical moment. By picking pioneers and an outlier, it also deals with unlikely cases. 
Thus, the book sets out to explain this concurrent asymmetry at different levels of analysis after 1980 in 
France, China, and Mexico, drawing on features of the domestic political economies of three countries 
that, counterintuitively—given all their apparent variation—had much in common at the outset but then 
diverged so much in the end. The first half of the book sets up the similarities, inspecting these states and 
exploring their predicaments and their leaders' choices in the late-twentieth-century world economy; the 
second half tackles the tale of these same states at home, as they encountered their own angry workers. 
In short, the work takes countries that began, as of 1979, by sharing traits, experiences, and inclinations, 
and then pits comparison of relative behavioral sameness (an unexpected sameness) at one level, the 
global one, against contrast at another level, the domestic one. 
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Preface 
Three weighty entities have engaged each other on the global stage in the nearly 
three decades since 1980: workers, states, and economically oriented supranational 
organizations (my name for international bodies comprised of several or a larger 
number of members, such as the North American Free Trade Association, the 
World Trade Organization, and the European Union). Many observers have con-
cluded, for any number of reasons, that the supranational should be the winners, 
hands down, with their larger presence, their economic clout, and their hegemonic 
hold on the rules of the game. 
Although this book shies away from pronouncing any final judgment, it delves 
into the nature of the interrelationships among the three contenders, as they 
clashed over their respective roles in three unlikely cases. In each of the countries 
assessed here—China, France, and Mexico—the years under review saw founda-
tional shifts in the place granted, the deference accorded, and the power wielded 
by each of the members of this set of players. My job was to unravel the threads of 
these changes. 
The three states are an unlikely assemblage for an analyst to tackle in tandem: 
they sit in different world regions, have dissimilar economies, and had arrived, as 
of 1980, at quite unlike levels of development. Politically, each at that time repre-
sented a disparate form of regime, with varying numbers of political parties and 
conflicting approaches to the treatment of citizen groups outside the government. 
But I was intrigued by the broad similarities in the styles of linkage between work-
ers and top state leaderships, and between states and the world economy in the 
prior thirty years. I also uncovered a relative sameness in the weakness of unions, 





than rhetoric, in accord with what were in all of them proud revolutionary tradi-
tions. Without spoiling the story, I can only say that the outcome is surprising as 
of late 2008, first of all in terms of the states' stances toward the supranational 
and second in relation to the divergent fortunes of disgruntled workers in the 
three states. 
I have four institutions to thank for the genesis and the realization of this book. 
First is the Smith Richardson Foundation, whose very generous grant enabled me 
to spend a year and a half reading widely in the early period of my work. Next 
comes the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California, Irvine, 
which, under the innovative leadership of Russell Dalton, provided a number of 
grants that allowed me to spend summers interviewing laid-off once-laborers in 
China. These conversations with the discarded gave me a serious appreciation of 
the wages of worklessness. Grants from the center also funded work by various 
graduate students (whom I name below) who collected data for me in France and 
Mexico, helped me organize and present my statistical data, and found some of the 
statistical information I needed to undergird my points. 
The third institution, the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia Uni-
versity, is one whose name I cannot type now without feelings of fondness and 
gratitude—for the many, many years during which its administrators provided 
me a title, an office, access to the Columbia library, copying privileges, and the 
height of good scholarly comradeship, encouragement, and stimulation. Finally, 
as I sit at a desk in another East Asian Institute, this one at the National University 
of Singapore, putting the final touches on the manuscript, I thank Dali Yang for 
inviting me to come here as a visiting research professor for four months, during 
which time I have been able to carve out the undisturbed days to draw these pages 
to their end. 
I acknowledge the journal Eurasian Geography and Economics for supplying me 
with permission to reprint in chapter 5 material from my article "Labor Discon-
tent in China in Comparative Perspective," which appeared in EGE 48, 4 (2007), 
413-38. 
Thanking individuals is one of the chief pleasures of the final moments of writ-
ing a book. The students I alluded to above include Celine Jacquemin and Sharon 
Lean, who gathered data for me in France and Mexico, respectively; Willy Jou, 
who located the statistics I needed on worker disturbances; and Ting Jiang, who 
not only was always available to order my numerical data some years ago and to 
prepare my tables and figures several times over but also saved the book from total 
oblivion in 2003, when she presented me with all my notes and files on disk after 
a house fire burned up my computer, my laptop, and every piece of paper and 
diskette I had accumulated over six years of research. 
I also acknowledge my debt to the following friends and colleagues who read 
one or more chapters and gave me insightful suggestions and reassurance: Salvatore 
Babones, Tom Bernstein (as my hu 
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Babones, Tom Bernstein (as my husband, how could he not?), David Cameron, 
Ruth Collier, Alex George, Miriam Golden, Evelyne Huber, Robert Kaufman, Mark 
Kesselman, Helen Milner, Vicky Murillo, Liz Perry, Alberta Sbragia, and Vivien 
Schmidt. Another kind of thank-you goes to friends who spent time thoughtfully 
talking with me about elements of my argument. Aside from some of those already 
noted, they are Mark Frazier, Ken Pomeranz, Kellee Tsai, and Susan Woodward. 
I went to these people in recognition of their expertise, and yet if some errors 
remain, it is no fault of theirs. This project has been long in the doing, so I hope 
I have not forgotten the name of anyone who helped along the way. 
The two anonymous readers were superb! I cannot thank them enough for 
pointing out to me all the infelicities of analysis in my early draft. I am aware that 
I have not exactly created the final product they may have had in mind, but this 
book could never have taken the shape it did without their invaluable criticism. 
I want to note here too, Kim Vivier's meticulous copyediting and Ange Romeo-
HalPs masterly oversight of the entire process of producing the volume. I also wish 
to acknowledge Estela Mendez and S. James Press, who created some of the tables 
and figures. 
I am very grateful, too, for the opportunity I had to present portions of the 
study at the following institutions, either on their campuses or at conferences they 
sponsored: the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, the British Asso-
ciation for Chinese Studies, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, the College of Social Sciences of the 
National Taiwan University, the Hoover Institution, the Center for Chinese Stud-
ies of the University of Michigan, the Patterson Center of the University of Ken-
tucky, the Universities Services Centre at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center of the University of Montana, Beijing 
University, Furman University, the Institute for National Policy Research of the 
Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, Monash University, Murdoch University, 
the Copenhagen Business School, Nanjing University, the Asian Studies Centre of 
St. Antony s College at Oxford University, the Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 
St. Lawrence University, the Urban China Research Centre at Cardiff University, 
the East Asian Institute at Columbia University, the University of Washington's 
Chinese Studies Program, the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, the 
Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, the University 
of British Columbia, the Center for Chinese Studies at Stanford University, the 
Asian Studies Center and the Global Studies Center at the University of Pittsburgh, 
Rutgers University, and the Columbia University Seminar on Globalization, Labor, 
and Popular Struggles. Feedback at all these venues, I am certain, made its way info 
the book before you now. 
Two people must be acknowledged above all. The first is Roger Haydon, who 
waxed enthusiastic when we initially discussed my ideas in August 2005 and then 
PREFACE 
kept me going for the next three years with his unfailingly sharp editorial eye and 
his constant support, advice, and advocacy behind the scenes. It is surely because 
of his sponsorship and drive for perfection that Cornell University Press has such 
distinction in the fields of political science and international political economy; 
that excellence is the reason I have aspired to publish a book with this press for 
many years. 
The other person is Thomas P. Bernstein, who had to endure my ten years of 
immersion in this project—involving lots of time, a fair share of frustrations, and 
a large number of conversations, not to mention travel to places he did not always 
want to visit. Thanks much, Tom, for being my intellectual and personal best col-
league and friend. 
D. J. S. 
Singapore 
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States' Struggle between Workers 
and the World Economy 
In the spring of 1979 the maiden elections to the European Parliament were soon 
to be held. During the campaign in France, Premier Jacques Chirac—along with 
his fellow Gaullist, Michel Debre—both of them ever allegiant to Charles de 
Gaulle's tenacious devotion to French national sovereignty, orchestrated an assault 
from the right on President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's pro-European position.1 
The charges broke out just as the president was sealing a deal on the European 
Monetary System (the EMS), one of the key institutions that was to pave the way 
for the European Union. 
On the left, Francois Mitterrand himself favored the European Community. 
But he was forced to bow to the oppositional, anti-supranationality stance of the 
several worker-prone parties—the Communists, the left-wing Socialists, and the 
Parti Socialiste Unifie—in order to forge a winning coalition on the left. Pub-
lic opinion overall went with the critics. Indeed, as Giscard's domestic political 
adviser later claimed, "the EMS was a huge political error that cost Giscard his 
reelection in 1981 "2 
In the same year, Mexican president Lopez Portillo of the Partido Revoluciona-
rio Institutional (the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution, or PRI) was urged 
by multinationals to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT), 
and went so far as to complete the requisite negotiations. But Mexico had lately 
located huge oil deposits and was enjoying high rates of growth, so many people 
1. Debre was then head of the Gaullist party, Rally for the Republic. 
2. Quoted in Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 
158-60,147. 
1 
2 STATES' GAINS, LABOR'S LOSSES 
wondered, what was the point of scrounging for ways to attract foreign funds? 
Widespread negative political reaction emerged at home against the proposition, 
and in the end Portillo declined to go on with the bid. Membership would have 
entailed demolishing trade barriers, and many party politicians, intellectuals, and, 
significantly for our purposes here, labor officials joined domestic industrialists in 
lining up against it. As Nora Lustig has explained the choice, "At the time GATT 
membership was viewed as a sign of weakness; Mexico did not need or wish to 
subjugate its trade policy to a multilateral body dominated by the Western indus-
trialized countries."3 
Meanwhile, the year 1979 also witnessed some Chinese scruples about participa-
tion in the world economy. At the beginning of the year, cautious Communist Party 
elites used the forum of a Party work conference to inveigh vociferously against 
what they viewed as an overhasty, overambitious venture into the global market-
place. Suddenly and without warning, China froze a large number of contracts it 
had already initialed for plant imports and suspended all ongoing trade negotia-
tions with Japan, in favor of a new policy of "readjusting, restructuring, consolidat-
ing, and improving" the national economy. A 1981 justification for these decisions 
included the curious phrase that "we should not indiscriminately import every-
thing or regard everything 'foreign as valuable and good. Our consistent policy is 
to give priority to self-reliance and regard foreign aid as supplementary."4 
Each of these episodes evinces fidelity toward long-ensconced and profound 
nationalistic sentiments that had surrounded varying degrees of distance from the 
markets abroad for decades, feelings that were running particularly strongly at that 
juncture. Even though France had by that point been participating for several 
decades in the expanding effort to forge a unified Europe, the moves of some of its 
leaders in that direction had at every step of the way been matched by ambivalence 
or indifference—sometimes even negativity—among the populace at large, as well 
as among other political figures.5 
True, China was just then surfacing from a longish stage of spurning the outside 
world. A major shift in trade which began with the initiation of detente with the 
United States in 1971 took off in full force after 1978, signaling such a transforma-
tion from what had gone before that one observer contrasted it with what he called 
"Chinas almost continuous isolation from the mainstream of the world economy 
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thirty years before 1979).6 
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cratic Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 162, 164; and Nora Lustig, Mexico: 
The Remaking of an Economy, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 130-31. 
4. Chae-Jin Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1984), 49-50; Ryosei Kokubun, "The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy-Making in China: The 
Case of Plant Cancellations with Japan," CQ 105 (1986), 30. 
5. This theme runs throughout Parsons, Certain Idea. 
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But the economic imbalances introduced by Chinas late-1970s purchasing 
spree so startled many of the top men in command that the more economically 
conservative among them were able to carry the day in the name of the "peoples' 
livelihood," and to do so for several years thereafter. Ryosei Kokubun has mused 
that the mood of the elite was very likely to have been affected by the contempo-
raneous appearance of Solidarity in Poland, especially given China's then current 
mounting social disorder, which included demonstrations by unemployed young 
people and strikes by workers. As master politician, soon to be China's paramount 
leader, Deng Xiaoping later explained, "We dared to cancel because of inflation and 
because a lot of complicated social problems might occur."7 
As of 1979, prior to finding the petroleum, Mexico had only recently thrown 
off a spate of economic troubles: ongoing deficits in the current account, inflation, 
capital flight, deficit spending, and climbing debt had all blighted the second half 
of the 1970s there. For the argument of this book, it is notable that the state had 
gotten itself into this predicament in part by excessive spending and borrowing 
motivated by fear of disorder from the disadvantaged. Given that the late 1960s 
and early 1970s had already seen much unrest, including from labor, politicians 
believed that instability could have ensued had the government pressed for finan-
cial discipline. But the fiscal problems became severe enough that Portillo's pre-
decessor, Luis Echeverria, had had to submit to an austerity program imposed 
by the International Monetary Fund in 1976. Just four years later, however, what 
turned out to be just a temporary relief provided by the oil find prodded Portillo 
suddenly to pronounce, sanguinely, that it was appropriate to "prepare ourselves 
to administer abundance" and to renounce external assistance.8 
Nothing in these three nearly simultaneous events in a set of seemingly dis-
parate nations would have disposed an onlooker to predict the denouement that 
followed these disavowals of the market-beyond-the-borders. Nonetheless, within 
a brief few years—from 1980 to 1983—every one of these long-time state-centric, 
import-substituting, fiercely independent, nationalistic, and, in their own percep-
tions, pro-labor revolutionary states was in the midst of gearing up for membership 
in a supranational organization, an accession that, for each, would spell the loss of 
o Zebadua, Mexico: The Struggle for Demo-
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6. Dorothy J. Solinger, From Lathes to Looms: China's Industrial Policy in Comparative Perspective 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 47; the quotation is from Denis Fred Simon, "The 
Evolving Role of Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer in China's Modernization Program," in 
China Briefing 1987, ed. John S. Major (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 43. 
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jobs for millions. Had the leaders forgotten about the laborers that their nations 
had once protected?. And how did labor in each case respond to this switch? 
Most significantly for our purposes, what did the common revolutionary back-
grounds in all of their pasts mean at that moment for the struggle these states were 
about to join between their workers, on the one hand, and the world forces that 
were suddenly and synchronistically reshaping their political economies, on the 
other? This book is about how an enduring legacy of revolution in these apparently 
dissimilar places structured state-labor relations in a time of crisis. In all of them, 
revolutionary-era outcomes left their mark on the roles and functions of unions, 
vis-a-vis their own states and vis-a-vis their worker charges. In turn, these disparate 
relationships made for differing types and levels of response at the working-class 
grass roots to the states' moves after 1980; repercussions from workers then set the 
style for subsequent state welfare replies. This, then, is a book centered on distinct 
models of affiliation—what I call "terms of attachment"—between unions, states, 
and workers, and the forms of behavior to which these terms disposed actors as all 
three parties faced foreign markets in three postrevolutionary states after 1980. Its 
message, in short, is one of a causal chain: historical legacies of labor-state bonds 
produced variant forms of militancy when crisis struck; that militancy then led to 
variable levels of welfare response from the state involved. 
To go on with the larger story: in China's case, the move to integrate externally 
was chiefly domestically generated, gingerly begun in 1979, and finally, after 1982, 
gathering force with time. A central impetus was to normalize the country and 
modernize its economy, in the interest of countering the recently deceased chair-
man of the Communist Party Mao Zedong's mobilizational upheavals. This was 
a play to the outside world, but it was also a step taken with an eye to the Chinese 
people: the new leaders intended thereby to win public legitimacy. In accord with 
these purposes, the political elite as early as 1980 began to associate with, and in 
1986 chose to apply for entry into, the GATT. 
True, China's negotiating partners did not grant it accession to the GATT's suc-
cessor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), until 2001. Yet starting in the early 
1980s, the country's leadership steadily undertook preparatory steps to hasten its 
acceptability to the organization's membership. And these steps amounted, implic-
itly, to what one might tag a "preemptive acquiescence" to the rules of the GATT In 
the wake of the growing leniency to foreign investors, the increasing autonomy for 
enterprise managers, the tariff reductions, and the regime-sponsored redundan-
cies and firm failures that unfolded one after the other between the early 1980s and 
late 1990s, tens of millions of workers lost their jobs.9 Many of them reacted to this 
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known. Dorothy J. Solinger, "Why We Cannot 
assault by openly and frequently protesting on the streets, egging the regime on to 
design national-scale welfare programs where none had obtained before. Though 
the old communist, state-labor alliance at first appeared to be wholly abandoned, 
public militancy reawakened the bond, if in starkly altered form. 
In France an ominous currency crisis broke out in 1982 and threw into disarray 
then-Socialist Party president Francois Mitterrand's original plan to pump up the 
economy and, especially, to enhance benefits for the working class. The problem 
was that this course collided with contractionary measures then being carried out 
in the economies of France's European Community trading partners. Within a 
year and a half, Mitterrand had acted to remain within the confines of the EMS, 
a regimen that eight of the nine then-members of the Community had forged in 
1979, with the aim of aligning the monetary regimes of these countries. The effort 
installed an Exchange Rate Mechanism that fixed the exchange rates of the partici-
pants within a relatively narrow band; to achieve this, the signatories made tight 
money and minimal inflation mandatory. As an outcome of Mitterrand's deci-
sion, France was forced to jettison its accustomed discretionary devaluations and 
disinflations which had previously recharged the economy, and which had thereby 
served as a boon to labor, ensuring steady high employment. 
The French decision to sign the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created the Euro-
pean Union (the EU) a decade later, with its rules about keeping debts and deficits 
low, served to exacerbate the austerity program (termed "rigeur" in France) that 
President Mitterrand had installed in 1983 when he first coordinated French mon-
etary policy with that of the EMS. Together these steps resulted in numerous firm 
bankruptcies and job losses: by 1997, the total losses over the years since 1970 had 
amounted to a stunning 41.6 percent of the original labor force.10 Throughout the 
period, workers' rebuttal was relatively lame; in turn, the state did little. 
And in Mexico an abrupt debt crisis erupted when oil prices plummeted at the 
same time as lending nations elevated their interest rates after 1980, leading the 
country to appeal again for outside assistance that once more came bound up in 
strings. Nevertheless, it was the officials in charge of the country, not outsiders, 
who set Mexico on a free-trade course as they deregulated, privatized, slashed 
trade barriers, and pledged themselves to follow the rules of the GATT in and 
after 1985. As in China, subsequent preparatory measures enabled the country 
later to seem suitable for entry into the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA) by 1990, the year that talks toward the establishment of that body got 
under way. 
10. Fritz W. Scharpf, "Economic Changes, Vulnerabilities, and Institutional Capabilities," in Wel-
fare and Work in the Open Economy: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, vol. 1, ed. Fritz W. Scharpf 
and Vivien A. Schmidt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108. 
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In the course of the structural adjustments Mexican politicians implemented, 
some millions of workers were severed from their posts, though the exact figures 
are difficult to gather. It is known, however, that by the end of 1994 the com-
bined total of the unemployed plus those at work in the underground economy 
meant that at least 28 percent of the workforce was without steady employment;11 
additionally, the numbers of jobs in manufacturing declined continuously for 
70 months between 1990 and 1996.12 Another one to two million positions disap-
peared in the period between 1990 and 2000, over half of them in agriculture,13 in 
a labor force of some 35 million. But workers were much more quiet than they had 
been in the past, and gained almost nothing in compensation. 
This book examines this set of phenomena, which was prevalent across the 
planet in recent decades: once state-strong, inward-oriented, labor-respecting 
nations reversed course around 1980 in the face of forces their leaders felt were 
overpowering and inescapable, given the leaders' own instincts for the survival, 
the global inclusion, and the glory of their countries. Clearly, a contest was on, 
with such states caught between two powerful pressures vying for supremacy, 
what scholars would see as two "independent variables," each pulling as an 
opposing vector: the economic imperatives of the new world order, born of for-
eign exchange and petroleum crises, on the one side, and—especially in these 
postrevolutionary nations—timeworn state-labor partnerships, on the other, 
whose terms of attachment were nationally variable but in each case formerly 
crucial. 
The book reviews this battle through an analysis of the actions of what could 
be viewed as these two competing independent variables. After presenting some 
roughly analogous background (along with some telling contrasts) to set the scene 
for the rest of the story, I go on to trace the effects of these variables. Follow-
ing a chapter that sets out broad-brush political-sociological historical similari-
ties among state-labor dyads in the three, I focus in the first section on the first 
of these variables, the forces of the global economy and their specific impact on 
11. Lorenzo Meyer, "Mexico: Economic Liberalism in an Authoritarian Polity," in Market Econom-
ics and Political Change: Comparing China and Mexico, ed. Juan D. Lindau and Timothy Cheek (Lan-
ham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 144. 
12. Jonathan Heath, "Original Goals and Current Outcomes of Economic Reform in Mexico," in 
Mexico's Private Sector: Recent History, Future Challenges, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998), 54. 
13. Orlandina de Oliveira and Brigida Garcia, "Socioeconomic Transformation and Labor Markets 
in Urban Mexico," in Global Restructuring, Employment, and Social Inequality in Urban Latin America, 
ed. Richard Tardanico and Rafael Menjivar Larin (Coral Gables, Fla.: North-South Center Press, 1997), 
212. Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 219, esti-
mates that one million jobs might have been lost at that time. John Audley, Sandra Polaski, Demetrios G. 
Papademetriou, and Scott Vaughan, NAFTA's Promise and Reality: Lessons-from Mexico for the Hemi-
sphere (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 18. 
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the three particular places. I consider the consequences of these forces, both at 
the outset of the 1980s and again later, as promoted by what I take as their proxy, 
supranational economic organizations (SEOs), as these states complied with the 
rules of the organizations. 
I proceed in the second part of the book to gauge the relative intensity of the 
blowback in each place, as workers in each country weighed the thrust of global 
forces (and their states' submission to them), as these forces affected themselves, 
and as states, in turn, reacted. For that second segment of the drama, the other 
independent variable is labor, and the respective role and effectiveness of its unions, 
as filtered by the state-assigned mission of unions, in each country. The book is 
about the nature of the interplay among these two competitors—global forces and 
workers—in their tug on the state over the tack to be taken by politicians. I seek 
to uncover differences among the three states in this struggle and to pin down the 
explanatory factor that accounts for the divergence. The answer, in this telling, is 
the variable terms dictating the nature of the ties between unions and their states 
and between unions and their workers. 
Why These Three States? 
At first glance the saga of these three states, straining under the double challenge of 
coping with the international debt, exchange, and oil crises of those times (at the 
global level) and of adapting their old promises to what had become a beleaguered 
labor force at home appear to be simply instances of a trajectory that many, if not 
most, states traversed after 1980.1 have three justifications for choosing these three 
particular countries for this comparative exercise. 
In the first place, two of them, China and Mexico, could be counted not just as 
longtime stubborn holdouts against the lure of the world economy in 1979, but 
also, soon afterward, as pacesetters. China was the first so-called socialist state in 
the particular "wave" of liberalization in which many such states began in 1980 to 
turn outward, leading, little by little, in its own case toward a total decimation of 
its command economy and onward to capitalism. Others followed, of course, but 
in most cases not for a decade.14 As for Mexico, it was also a leader: in the words of 
Maria Victoria Murillo, "In the 1990s, Mexico triggered the debt crisis that spread 
14. Mitchell A. Orenstein and Lisa E. Hale, "Corporatist Renaissance in Post-communist Central 
Europe," in The Politics of Labor in a Global Age: Continuity and Change in Late-industrializing and 
Post-socialist Economies, ed. Christopher Candland and Rudra Sil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 258-82. For an earlier phase in which similar, but failed, efforts were undertaken, see Susan L. 
Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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throughout Latin America, creating the conditions that provoked the political con-
version of populism into neoliberalism."15 
France was by no means a pacesetter in states of its sort, but it had distinction in 
a different way. Mitterrand's election as president at the head of the Socialist Party 
in 1981 delayed a process of acquiescence with the country's European confreres 
that would have matched that of the rest of the Community, had Giscard's 1981 
election gone otherwise. So in each of these nations there unfolded a story that 
was special within that state's own particular category of countries. For this reason 
alone, they merit a joint and exacting examination. 
Second, superficially speaking, each of these states experienced—or, perhaps 
better put, their leaders eventually chose to experience—the same train of events 
around the same time. That is, in or soon after 1980 the political elite in each 
aspired to solve the same generic problem, capital shortage, through joining the 
world. This was for all of them in one way or another a problem brought on by 
currents coursing across the globe. But significantly, these were currents whose 
jolts clashed with these states' particular and shared modi operandi. Each had long 
sustained a style of rule that had catered to at least an elite among labor, often in 
rhetoric but also in fact. Each decided (as did many other nations) to withstand the 
new global tides by preparing to enter supranational organizations. In each case, 
given the rules of the organizations to which they acceded (the European Union, 
the World Trade Organization, and the North American Free Trade Association, 
respectively), an offshoot of that move was to push workers from their posts. 
And yet the sameness of this selected path, and of its critical effect for labor, 
went only so far, I contend. Because of the variant missions and vocations of the 
trade unions in each place (the "terms of attachment" of the unions to the polity 
and to their workers)—which, I show, fundamentally distinguished the behaviors 
of workers in one country from those in the others—the activism of the working 
class, and, as a result, I argue, the response of the state to workers, was markedly 
diverse in the three of them. I situate the origin of these differences in disparate 
revolutionary traditions in these three postrevolutionary states. 
As for outcomes, where fragmented and competitive unions achieved little in 
representing French workers, unions allegiant to the state kept workers quiet in 
corporatist Mexico, and unions charged chiefly with sustaining productivity left 
angry workers largely to their own devices in China. Concretely, to give just one 
set of statistics, the number of strikes and lockouts in France over the years 1980 
to 2001 peaked in 1982, the year before Mitterrand's U-turn toward the European 
Community's regimen, thereafter dropping to nearly half of that in many of the 
following years until 1999. In Mexicc 
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following years until 1999. In Mexico the contrasts between pre-1982 and there-
after are sharper yet. Where in the first three years of the 1980s more than 1,000 
strikes and lockouts broke out annually, reaching as many as 1,925 in 1982, imme-
diately thereafter—just when the force of the debt crisis was felt the most—the 
numbers abruptly plummeted to around a mere 100 per year; by 1995 the counts 
had descended into the single digits. For China there are no overall numbers. But 
one scholar has noted as many as 9,559 incidents in just one province (the one 
hardest hit) between January 2000 and September 2002, an average of ten per day 
over nearly three years.16 This equaled roughly two and half times the number of 
outbreaks in the city of Paris at about the same time. 
In terms of welfare, chapter 6 points out that between 1990 and 2001 the French 
government's social expenditures rose from 26.61 percent to 28.45 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), an increase of just 1.84 percent, while Mexico's climbed 
from 3.84 to only 5.10 percent, an increase of 1.26 percent. In China, however, 
the central government hiked up its expenditures in this category as a percentage 
of GDP from under 2 percent in 1980 to about 8.3 percent in 2005, more than 
quadrupling its outlay, proportional to GDP. Certainly other factors can be called 
on to help make some sense of these discrepancies, such as the variable baselines 
in the respective sizes of the workforces or the disparate welfare starting points in 
each state, and I allude to these in the relevant chapters.17 But the big sociopoliti-
cal explanation I offer for the wide range in these reactions constitutes the chief 
empirical finding of this book. Studying three places whose leaders' past commit-
ments to workers and whose later choices globally were similar but whose workers 
behaved rather differently, allows me to draw a conclusion about labor politics that 
would not have appeared so starkly otherwise. This is my second justification for 
considering these three places. 
And third, these three countries would normally not be analyzed together. We 
have here a democracy with its multiparty system; a regime that was authoritarian 
with an overarching, dominant party during the time when the pivotal events 
unfolded, a regime that later became "semi-authoritarian" and finally democ-
ratizing; and a post-totalitarian government yet ruled by a communist party.18 
Economically, a capitalist, a mixed, and a socialist economy obtained in them, 
respectively. Thus the enterprise of talking about them in tandem is ipso facto 
16. Murray Scot Tanner, "China Rethinks Unrest," Washington Quarterly 27,3 (2004), 140. 
17. Thanks to one of my anonymous readers for this point. 
18. Roderic Ai Camp, in Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Transformation, 4th ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 10, refers to it as "semiauthoritarian" up to the year 2000. Totalitarian 
regimes are ones in which the regime attempts to control all activity, repress all antistate or otherwise 
autonomous behavior, and to indoctrinate the population with the values of the state. The term "post-




10 STATES' GAINS, LABOR'S LOSSES 
novel. I hold that examining them together yields a set of surprising findings that 
disorient a number of prior understandings. 
Putting it differently, I inquire, then: why did countries that elected to act simi-
larly globally turn out to vary so strikingly internally, at the domestic level, when it 
came to resultant interactions between unions and the state? That the book focuses 
on three very dissimilar states serves to demonstrate the wide sweep of countries 
that, rather comparably, were compelled to confront the global economy in new 
ways at a critical historical moment. By picking pioneers and an outlier, it also 
deals with unlikely cases. 
Thus, the book sets out to explain this concurrent asymmetry at different lev-
els of analysis after 1980 in France, China, and Mexico, drawing on features of 
the domestic political economies of three countries that, counterintuitively— 
given all their apparent variation—had much in common at the outset but then 
diverged so much in the end. The first half of the book sets up the similarities, 
inspecting these states and exploring their predicaments and their leaders' choices 
in the late-twentieth-century world economy; the second half tackles the tale of 
these same states at home, as they encountered their own angry workers. In short, 
the work takes countries that began, as of 1979, by sharing traits, experiences, and 
inclinations, and then pits comparison of relative behavioral sameness (an unex-
pected sameness) at one level, the global one, against contrast at another level, the 
domestic one. 
Previous Approaches 
During the closing decades of the twentieth century, as global waves in their mul-
tiple guises washed across the map and states reacted to the meanderings of the 
currents, internal politics and their players in many states were altered, sometimes 
in abrupt and serious ways. The most obvious difference between this study and 
others about this phenomenon is that most other observers have addressed this 
large issue by considering countries that have much in common, rendering the 
findings relatively narrow and the variables the analyses settle on sometimes pos-
sibly spurious. Here it is not the type of regime, the kind of party system, the party 
in power, the nature of the labor movement, or the "depth of the economic crisis" 
faced—all factors that previous authors have relied on to drive their dependent 
variables—that accounts for the situations in the places under review.19 
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These variables cannot explain the widespread commonality of the steps lead-
ers in these countries (and in many others) took in inserting their so dissimilar 
nations more thoroughly into the world market, for the three states under review 
here differed in all these regards. Nor can they clarify why leaders in these three 
countries went on to differ in their replies to the variable militancy among their 
respective labor forces that followed that insertion—why it was, for instance, that, 
among the three, both the outcry and the compensatory outlay were the most 
pronounced in communist China. 
In any event, earlier accounts ignore what I find to be key: the assigned mis-
sion and role of the labor unions in each state, which I connect with revolutionary 
histories. In two of the cases (China and Mexico) the functions of unions diverged 
somewhat from the jobs that unions are generally presumed to carry out, that is, 
representing and fighting for the workforce. Besides, the types of variables usually 
used to analyze labor politics—such as union density and union concentration— 
provide no guidance. Welfare rejoinders in these countries were also counterintui-
tive, as the nation among them usually thought to be least accountable, China, was 
also the one most responsive to its losers. 
Not only were typically cited structural variables about states and unions not 
helpful in explaining the events under review; the quality of the economic crises 
that pushed the leaders in these countries onto new avenues varied substantially, 
even as their policy choices were essentially the same. Mexico's plight was the most 
desperate, as its economy was hanging on the brink of collapse in 1982; France's 
leaders' situation was dire, but by no means disastrous, as of that year. In China, to 
the contrary, the economy was poised to go on uninterruptedly, without change, as 
of 1980. But its efficiency and productivity were both judged to be unsatisfactorily 
low, at least in the eyes of the coterie of newly ensconced politicians who wished 
to validate their rule to their citizenry. And yet, despite this dissimilitude in the 
extent of catastrophe, the trajectory of their economic departures from the twen-
tieth century was remarkably parallel for France, Mexico, and China. On the other 
hand, their respective workers' activism was not, and, in turn, neither were their 
states' reactions to workers. 
Accepted theory relating to state policy on labor looks at the strength of labor 
unions and/or at the political parties to which unions are linked. But such 
approaches fail to make sense of the particular story here. First of all, consider the 
nature of what is known as the "labor regime": each of these countries could in 
versity Press, 1996), 40-44. "Depth of economic crisis" is one of the variables suggested in Katrina 
Burgess and Steven Levitsky, "Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in Latin America: Environmental 
and Organizational Determinants of Party Change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela," Com-
parative Political Studies 36, 8 (October 2003), 886-87 and 89^95. 
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some ways be categorized as the site of a "weak labor economy."20 For labor was 
indeed "weak" in them all, in that in none of them was there a coherent or cogent 
labor movement operating expressly and autonomously to serve workers' interests 
and needs. Nor, as a result, could labor pose and be treated as an equal interlocu-
tor in relation to the political regime in any of them. But categorization of these 
regimes as "weak labor economies" falls down in other ways: it was not the case in 
these countries that "powerful rightist political parties" "confronted much weaker 
labor movements" in these places as of 1980, which those who coined this label 
would expect. Nor were they arenas where, consequentiy, labor was often left to the 
mercy of unmitigated market forces, as the use of this term also suggests. More-
over, the polity in each one in some sense truly pursued labor's interests. So a study 
of these countries must put this oft-used label aside. 
A second, similar feature of these polities counters another approach, one that 
explains variation of state policy toward labor in terms of party-union ties. Each of 
these states was under the governance of a /e/t-leaning party (in China and France, 
indeed, parties that were named "communist" and "socialist," respectively; in Mex-
ico, one called "revolutionary"), not a powerful rightist one, which that approach 
would have assumed, at the point when the anti-labor shift occurred. According 
to this theory, labor-based, socialist-styled parties are supposed to be partial to the 
working class, not to call for its displacement. So an argument that leftist parties 
will be kind to the working class and its unions also must fall by the wayside. 
As noted above, when workers were dismissed and became disruptive, the three 
governments reacted with different forms and amounts of recompense, at least for 
some portion of the disaffected. The contrasts among them, however, are not expli-
cated by the categories used in previous efforts to differentiate how states treat 
losers in the global economy. For the usual debate addresses only whether concerns 
over "compensation," or, alternatively, a drive for maximal "efficiency," determines 
the behavior that outwardly oriented nations adopt toward victims when the state 
intensifies the level of its foreign commerce. That hypothesis, too, figures that the 
choice is a function of the color of the party in power. 
But I found that unions' appointed charge (in some ways a product of the revo-
lutions out of which they each grew)—and their workers' corresponding conduct 
in each nation during the 1980s and 1990s—explains the greater restiveness dis-
played by the angered working people of the People's Republic, and also helps 
to make sense of the more thoroughgoing financial and social security responses 
adopted by that authoritarian polity, as compared with the states in France and 
20. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's 'Left' for the 
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Mexico. The leanings of the parties in power as of 1983 were the same in all three 
countries—they were all leftist—but the outcomes varied. 
From a different angle, researchers have inquired in general terms as to the 
degree to which international, as opposed to domestic, elements shape states' eco-
nomic policies. Peter Gourevitch's seminal article in this field posed the question 
of the influence of international events and forces on domestic policymaking.21 
Since that article was published, other studies have grappled with the variety of 
ways in which outside factors might impinge on domestic politics and the chan-
nels through which this might occur. But the focus in many of these studies is on 
politics in—and only in—the advanced capitalist democracies; or, where the study 
includes a few nondemocratic countries, it makes the assumption that the politics 
of those other places will be governed by just the same rules as they are in states 
that are democratic.22 Scholars tend to point, accordingly, to mechanisms that 
operate only in developed democracies—as, for instance, by normalizing the style 
of connections between interest groups and ruling elites in democratic regimes 
and then extrapolating their findings to regimes of quite different types. 
One study, for instance, explained international economic policy transforma-
tions by hypothesizing that domestic groups affected by changes in relative prices 
will pressure their own governments to respond to such changes, with consequent 
policy repercussions.23 That study credited the "policy preferences of actors with 
producing changes in domestic coalitions, policies and institutions." And yet, for 
instance, there is no evidence that in China (one of the cases in that study) the 
policy changes of 1980 had anything to do with the preferences of affected group-
ings, as opposed to being purely the product of leaders' choices.24 
Thus, the focus on the advanced democracies inclines scholars to assume uni-
versality in the ability of well-placed social forces in democracies to influence their 
governments on their own behalf. But workers are not necessarily well placed; 
besides, we have here three cases in which all the states in the face of global change 
at least initially ignored the wishes of the workers, and in which powerful political 
executives took decisions without much if any social input at all. Indeed, what I 
am investigating is precisely how once favored social forces in fact did lose jobs or 
21. Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Poli-
tics" 10 32,4 (1978), 881-911. 
22. A major exception is Candland and SO, Politics of Labor, though here states of a different sort 
are clumped together for analysis: late-industrializing and post-socialist ones. 
23. Helen V. Milner and Robert O. Keohane, "Internationalization and Domestic Politics: A Con-
clusion," in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Keohane and Milner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 243-258. 
24. This claim appears in the introduction to ibid., 6. But in From Lathes to Looms I detail the 
impotence at the time of the country's turn outward of the industrial sectors that had been dominant 
until then. 
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benefits or both, not how such societal segments were able to stymie attempts to 
undercut their positions. For that is not the story in my cases. 
Another version of this sort of study credits the electoral power of interest 
groups that had been the beneficiaries of the relevant programs. That angle may 
work to some extent to elucidate the situation for France as a democracy, and it 
goes part of the way toward explaining what happened in late-1980s Mexico. In 
addition to the problem that only one of my three nations had meaningful elec-
tions in the 1980s, looking to past recipients and their previous power cannot place 
the three countries within one explanatory framework, which is my objective here, 
as I look for answers that cross regime type. Neither is such a logic useful when 
only one party holds a hegemonic position, such that elections become largely 
empty exercises, as in both China and Mexico in the 1980s and still in China today. 
Nor does it work when the parties capable of capturing elections are largely in 
agreement about the thrust of policy, as in France after 1983. Neither is the argu-
ment valid when losers—at least at the moment of decision—have negligible if 
any channels of access to the deciders. 
Other theories assert that alterations in state strategy are a function of changing 
power relations among domestic political forces, such as those within a govern-
ing party, those between that party and its coalition partners, or those between 
opposing parties.25 But here, too, is a finding that would apply only to countries 
where competition between political parties is the stuff of politics. This would 
not have been the case where one party was perpetually dominant (as in Mexico 
between 1929 and, effectively, the end of the 1990s) or where the ruling party is 
the sole party on the scene, as in China right up to the present. One more claim 
attributes the way international forces are domestically processed to the workings 
of domestic institutions, as these institutions (allegedly) reflect citizens' prefer-
ences and as they structure the access to policymaking open to particular groups.26 
Again, such a formulation is suited just to democratic systems, for governmental 
institutions do not reflect citizens' preferences, nor do they provide formal entree 
to the top, in all forms of state. 
One more line of inquiry, referenced briefly above, studies specifically the impact 
of global economic forces on governmental welfare spending. It asks whether these 
effects are benign or deleterious for affected domestic groups. The chief question 
is whether governments are forced by competition in world markets to cut social 
25. W. Rand Smith, The Left's Dirty Job: The Politics of Industrial Restructuring in France and Spain 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998). 
26. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic 
Policy," in Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, ed. Katzen-
stein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 295-336, and Small States in World Markets: 
Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Milner and Keohane, "Internation-
alization," 4. 
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spending at home in an effort to enhance efficiency or whether, instead, such com-
petition compels state leaders to compensate domestic parties and groups that 
suffer from the inequalities and insecurities engendered by international trade, 
in the hope of forestalling unrest.27 The initial study casting the issues in these 
terms judges that left-wing parties, especially if supported by strong labor move-
ments, are apt to champion social welfare spending in times of externally induced 
adversity while parties on the right are not.28 But its authors themselves admit that 
their research was unable to account for the fact that some governments, including 
Mitterrand's in France, "initially pursue partisan policies but subsequently turn 
dramatically away from them."29 
The fact that what happened in France in the 1980s—and in Mexico and 
China after 1980, as well—cannot be addressed by the data in that work suggests 
that considering just the partisan color of the party in power (which one can do 
meaningfully only in democracies in any case, and not always even in them), and 
looking merely at domestic factors (whether they be domestic groups reacting to 
internationally driven changes, domestic governing coalitions and political parties, 
or domestic political institutions) is insufficient for seeking more general causal 
explanations for the heavy imprint of global economic power in recent decades on 
internal labor and welfare politics. Part of the problem, too, is that much of this 
form of research is quantitative and sometimes fails to explore the larger socioeco-
nomic contexts, the pathways, or the political mechanisms involved when global-
ization promotes a heightened or a lessened welfare effort. I home in on just these 
circumstances and pathways for the three countries I investigate. 
A major difficulty in all these analytical approaches is that none of them can 
systematically address situations in which—in the absence of any specific domes-
tic pressures (whether because there are no channels for the transmission of the 
pressures or because the channels are temporarily discounted)—governments, in 
reaction to what their leaders see as sudden and threatening global provocations, 
switch their basic policy stance in ways that injure workers. The bias toward study-
ing only democracies, with their special burden of explicit and overt accountability, 
27. Geoffrey Garrett, "Globalization and Government Spending around the World," Studies in 
Comparative International Development35,4 (2001), 3-29, and "Global Markets and National Politics: 
Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?" 10 52 (1998): 787-824. 
28. The initial study was Garrett and Lange, "Political Responses." Other prominent ones making 
similar arguments are John D. Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and Leonard Ray, "The Welfare State in Hard 
Times," in Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary 
Marks, and John D. Stephens (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 164-93, and Evelyne 
Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global 
Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). An excellent summary of approaches is in Brian 
Burgoon, "Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties that Bind," IO 55,3 (Sum-
mer 2001), 509-551. 
29. Garrett and Lange, "Political Responses," 563. 
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also inhibits analysts' ability to explain abrupt reversals and major alterations in 
states' customary coalitional stances which violate the interests of past domestic 
alliance partners. That bent may also miss the dynamism that develops when states 
are simultaneously battered by global shocks, on one side, and by their own work-
forces (and their former commitments to them), on the other. 
That states of varying regime types behave similarly under like economic con-
ditions—not only in respect to economic policy, but also in terms of leaders' 
choices about political allies and their initial disregard for losers—should direct 
the researcher to answers that go beyond the nature of domestic political institu-
tions and democratic procedures. A critical point is that a review of the internal 
political institutions of states by no means always provides for adequate or accu-
rate readings or predictions of state policy or behavior. That is very much the 
case in this book, where domestic institutions are fundamentally noncomparable, 
where a democratic multiparty state is to be considered alongside a single-party 
socialist state and a one-party-dominant authoritarian state, and where the nature 
of specific domestic groups' connections with, access to, and potency in regard to 
central power structures needs further exploration. 
In short, none of these analyses are of much help in making sense of the vari-
able downturns in the context of globalization of formerly employed people who 
were once endowed with satisfactory welfare benefits when those beneficiaries 
lack the backing of strong labor movements, where interest groups and support 
bases can be, and have been, abandoned at will by centralized, powerful states bent 
on greater productivity and competitiveness in global markets (such as France, 
Mexico, and China after 1980), and yet where the state has succored workers in 
the past and where an elite portion of the working class has long been privileged.30 
Under some conditions some of those workers can recapture some clout later on. 
The book seeks to search for those conditions. 
Moreover, in some cases where the state concentrates enough power centrally 
that it is nearly autonomous from opposing viewpoints, it is the executive and not 
the parties or the social groups that define and can alter the status of various social 
elements.31 In these cases, one can infer relative power resources only ex post facto 
30. Robert Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubiergo, "Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social 
Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973-97," World Politics 53:553-87, 
suggest something related on 582. 
31. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "Introduction: Institutions and Economic Adjust-
ment," in The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the 
State, ed. Haggard and Kaufman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 8, emphasize the 
significance of "politicians' independence" in their ability to carry out adjustment. They do not note, 
however, that abandoned groups can still have some leverage. Jonah D. Levy, "France: Directing Adjust-
ment?" in Welfare and Work in the Open Economy: Diverse Responses to Common Challenges, vol. 2, ed. 
Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 326, points to the 
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xford University Press, 2000), 326, points to the 
by observing which groups have won or done not so badly in the end. But one can-
not predict a future distribution of goods and benefits ex ante just by observing 
past state allocations—or even by simply ascertaining which groups seemed to be 
somehow in league with leaders in immediately prior periods. 
Structure of the Study 
The remainder of the book begins, in its first section, by pointing to similarities 
among the countries, first in terms of the political sociology of the recent past, 
in chapter 2. That second chapter sets out three broad similarities that the three 
countries to be treated here shared in generic terms in their state-labor relations 
over the years between the 1940s and 1980. Granted, these traits could describe a 
range of states. But it is rare to find so seemingly dissimilar states within this large 
set examined together in one study. 
The state-labor dyad—which models the stance of labor as forged through 
enduring relationships—in each of them, my first major (or macro) independent 
variable, was characterized by three critical features. These were, first, state protec-
tionism for both domestic firms and for the state-affiliated workers in them, an 
insulation tied to these states' import-substitution-oriented trading pattern; and 
second, weakly organized labor unions sheltered by, but also obligated to, the central 
government. A third feature particularly characterized these three nations, setting 
them apart from most others: a distant revolution waged at least in part on behalf 
of an underclass, plus a state constitution that enshrines the ideals of that revolu-
tion, resulting in specific state commitments and worker expectations. In line with 
that revolutionary heritage, each saw more recent rebellion that unnerved the lead-
ership, rendering it notably risk-averse and therefore prone to accommodate work-
ers. Significantly, however, the legacies of these revolutions were not the same, and 
this had implications later for the nature of the differing "state-labor dyads" (dyads 
that were connected by distinctive "terms of attachment") in the three. Those dyads 
lie at the core of the variable terms of attachment in the three states. 
In chapters 3 and 4, global forces emerge as my second large (or macro) indepen-
dent variable. These chapters use process tracing to uncover specific commonali-
ties that were salient for these states around and just after 1980. Chapter 3 identifies 
like developmental patterns from the past, patterns connected to the three features 
in the labor-state dyad described in chapter 2. It then reviews particular common-
alities among the political economies of the states that led up to the crises of the 
"relative isolation of policymakers in France, given the fragmentation and inability to collaborate of the 
country's intermediary institutions. 
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1980s in these places. In brief, their prior Keynesian-style developmental modes 
culminated around 1980 in producing developmental cul-de-sacs and economic 
emergencies, given the nature of the world economy at the time. The chapter shows 
precisely how these states' respective domestic economic patterns caused predica-
ments as those patterns collided with conditions in the world economy in the late 
1970s. The chapter also traces how leaders in each state ultimately handled those 
encounters by adopting comparable stances, especially by opting to join SEOs in 
the 1980s. 
In chapter 4, SEOs enter the scene as a proxy for global forces, as key authorities 
in each of the three states steer their nation to enter one (or more) of them. Here I 
explain why the political elites in all three countries pursued membership in SEOs 
and, on obtaining it, subsequently ousted millions of workers from their jobs. I 
focus on the rules of the SEOs to underline the connections between turning out-
ward and a concomitant loosening of an age-old commitment to labor in all three. 
Briefly, I argue, the rules of the supranational body each joined, and with which 
each country's top political elite agreed to comply (as its members assimilated the 
philosophy about growth and development that the rules embody), were either the 
immediate or at the very least the implicit spur for the shedding of labor in each of 
them. These rules had this effect not just because state officials strove to align their 
behavior with the rules once their states became members of the organizations. 
For Mexico and China, perhaps even more than after entry had been achieved, 
the rules possessed the power to coerce conformity during the period when these 
states were still struggling to qualify for entry. 
After setting up these similarities in historical political sociology, in past devel-
opmental models that made for later susceptibility to global forces, and in the 
impact on the states of the SEOs they entered, I ask in the book's second section 
why the outcomes for both protest and welfare differed among the three places. I 
argue that the answer lay in the disparities among them in regard to the variable 
terms of attachment by which—or the dissimilar ways in which—unions were 
related both to the state and to their members in the three countries. This factor, 
in turn, I contend, can be traced back to diverse revolutionary legacies in the three. 
In chapters 5 and 6,1 draw on the unions' resultant positions as the crucial vari-
able that differentiated the state-labor dyad among these three countries, in order 
to account first for variant levels of protest and, second, given these states' high 
sensitivity to unrest, for welfare response in the three countries. 
My simple answer is that unions had previously been most ineffective (in all ways) 
in China, as compared with those in France or Mexico. Thus, upon liberalization 
and economic reform, when unions became even more impotent there than ever, 
disgruntled workers were freed to engage in wildcat strikes without the involve-
ment of the unions—without, that is, either enjoying the benefit (and sometimes 
the difficulty) of unions' coordination, as in France, or suffering the frustration 
of union bosses' forestallment, as in 
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Chinese workers were both poised and released to resist much more vociferously 
than were those in either France or Mexico. Accordingly, I argue, their relatively 
more anxious rulers reciprocated with more of a welfare payback in that country 
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, weighs the relative contributions of my two 
large sets of factors—global forces-cum-SEOs versus workers (and state commit-
ments to workers)—to the choices each of these states' politicians took as the past 
century began to come to a close. 
Thus, within a matter of just a few years the political elites of all three of these 
countries abruptly left the track their predecessors had followed, seemingly aban-
doning the masses of their laboring followers, once a key part of their support base, 
as they did so. As, in so acting, they each turned to embrace a much more distant 
set of allies—that is, new associates in new global leagues—while the old domestic 
coalitions that had shored up (or, in the case of France, helped to shore up) their 
prior political economies at home came apart, and the millions of workers who 
had kept those economies in motion for decades were left without support. 
Those thereby deposited outside the fold economically became for a time 
politically and socially excluded (though neither always nor everywhere with the 
same intensity or severity). National inclusion at the global or suprastate level, 
consequently, was for these countries to substitute for individual inclusion within 
the polity at the mass level, as the site of the tribunal imagined to judge the state's 
legitimacy was upgraded: where once the state in France, Mexico, and China had 
earned its right to rule as provider, via broad inclusiveness at home,32 now these 
same states planned to gain that justification as player, by social closure at home 
and by incorporation abroad within an outside, august ensemble. But what was 
the upshot for labor politics? 
Once France, Mexico, China entered—or prepared to enter—extranational 
economic organizations, these three countries were all constrained to shed their 
working-class supporters. Past economic policies and prior properties of states' 
ties with unions thereafter variably disposed workers to rally for their rights, 
regime type notwithstanding, my argument maintains. By looking simultaneously 
at the dynamics of global entry and labor loss, this book provides new insights 
into structurally comparable economic and political forces that, because of differ-
ing terms attaching unions to states and to workers, produced politically different 
outcomes in labor politics. 
32. Vivienne Shue, "Legitimacy Crisis in China " in State and Society in 21st-century China: Crisis, 
Contention, and Legitimation, ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (New York: Routledge/Curzon, 
2004), 24-49. 
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